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Although international programs for carbon osets play an important role in
current and prospective climate-change policy, they continue to be very controversial.
Asymmetric information creates several incentive problems, include adverse selection
and moral hazard, in oset markets. The current regulatory focus on additionality
tends to paint all these problems with a broad brush without proper consideration
of the context or their implications.
1 The Motivation for Oset Markets
The evolution and growth of oset markets is recounted in Lecoq and Ambrosi (2007),
and Grubb, et al. (2010). The most signicant current global oset program, the Clean
Development Mechanism, emerged from the Kyoto treaty. It combined the desires for
exible market-based mechanisms with the goal of nancing a low-carbon development
trajectory in emerging economies. Oset mechanisms comprise a prominent part of the
proposed U.S. CO2 market articulated in H.R. 2454 (the \Waxman-Markey" bill). There
are also important roles for osets in regional U.S. carbon markets such as in California
and the northeast U.S. as well as for voluntary carbon oset markets.
The primary distinction between oset programs and other forms of regulation are
that osets pay rms to reduce their emissions rather than raise the costs of continuing
to emit. The entire concept of oset programs is therefore closely related to the question
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1of the `reach' of traditional regulations. If all sources of emissions would fall under tra-
ditional regulations, there would be no need to extend those regulations through osets.
There are many reasons why traditional regulatory measures may be constrained. In the
case of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the most obvious is that emissions from any
given jurisdiction hold consequences for the entire world. The fact that environmental
damages span boundaries far greater than the reach of even international organizations
makes the consistent application of traditional regulation almost impossible. A second
reason is practicality. The eective implementation of cap-and-trade mechanisms requires
reasonable monitoring and transactions costs for the sources falling under the cap. Some
non-point sources of GHG emissions, such as those associated with land-use, would be dif-
cult to integrate into a cap-and-trade program under any circumstances. A third reason
is political; some sectors may simply be more successful at convincing governments that
they should be exempted from mandatory emissions limits.
If we accept the fact that some countries and economic sectors are unlikely to fall
under a mandatory limit on their GHG emissions, the question then becomes how best
to motivate those sectors to reduce emissions. Ideally those actions would be coordinated
in some fashion with the sectors that are directly regulated. This is where oset markets
come into play.
Although the fundamental need for osets is rooted in the limits of regulatory juris-
diction, today's programs are in fact motivated by a host of goals. A primary goal for
many regulated industries is cost control. The prospect of a deep pool of oset projects
providing a potentially low-cost supply of reductions creates an eective cap on allowance
prices in a cap-and-trade system.1 Among developing nations and many NGO's, oset
mechanisms have been seen as an important new source of capital to aid in development
and the alleviation of poverty. For rms and individuals outside of sectors that might fall
directly under a cap, such as the U.S. agricultural sector, an oset mechanism oers a
potentially lucrative new source of revenue.2
From the perspective of economic eciency, the great promise of an oset market is
the potential for reducing GHG emissions at a much lower cost. To the extent that low-
cost options for reducing emissions exist in sectors that are not directly regulated under
1The economic analysis of proposed GHG regulations by agencies such as U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the California Air Resources Board highlight the sensitivity of future allowance prices to
the cost and availability of osets.
2USDA, 2009.
2a cap, an oset market allows for these \low-hanging fruit" to be harvested in place of
more expensive reductions from the capped sector. For example, if the marginal source
of abatement under the european emission trading system (ETS) costs 20 euro/ton, and
the opportunity cost of preventing a similar ton of CO2e through deforestation in Africa
is 2 euro/ton, the same level of CO2e emissions could be achieved at a cost 18 less euros if
a european rm were allowed to oset its ETS emissions by nancing the African project.
This relates closely to the notion of extending the jurisdiction of a cap. If there were
no jurisdictional or measurement issues, these same eciencies could be reaped by simply
placing all relevant sectors under the same cap-and-trade regime. As I discuss below,
this \maximum cap" approach would also avoid many of the information and incentive
problems that are of such concern in oset markets. However, the reality given both
domestic and international political and legal constraints is that important sectors and
countries will be outside of a binding cap-and-trade regime. The question is therefore
whether the informational and incentive problems with oset markets can be suciently
overcome to capture these potential savings.
2 Criticisms of Oset Markets
Despite the alluring potential of oset mechanisms for reducing mitigation costs and over-
coming jurisdictional boundaries, the programs remain quite controversial. At the heart of
most criticisms of oset programs is the concern that the programs are not in fact yielding
the emissions reductions implied by their transacted quantities. In this section I discuss
the various types of enforcement concerns in the context of the more general economic and
regulatory issues to which they are related. In the following section I explore the various
methodologies that have been applied to mitigating these problems.
One can attribute most potential verication and enforcement problems to three key
institutional factors that dominate oset programs. An important observation to which
I will return, however, is that two of these three factors would apply to any regulations
directed at mitigating GHG emissions, although the interaction of these factors does make
the problem worse in the context of osets. The rst factor is jurisdictional. Oset pro-
grams test the limits of international regulatory cooperation in that diering regulatory
agencies in dierent countries need to at least agree on consistent measurement and re-
porting metrics, and ocials in the \host" countries of projects need to provide or allow
3access to data for verication purposes. Another complication from jurisdictional limits
are the many types of indirect impacts that climate policies can have on land-use, energy
consumption, and industrial activity in other jurisdictions. These eects include the leak-
age of emissions to other jurisdictions as well as the types of indirect land-use questions
that have come to play a large role in biofuels and forestry policy. All these indirect im-
pacts have the consequence of reducing the actual net reductions of GHG emissions from
the level one might measure by focusing only on \local" reductions.
The second institutional issue relates to the strength of regulatory and governance
institutions within many of the countries that might seem to be prime candidates for sell-
ing osets. This is perhaps most pronounced in the context of land-use related osets.3
Unfortunately the development of strict environmental measurement, let alone enforce-
ment, practices is likely beyond the resources of the regulatory institutions in many of
these countries. This problem is greatly complicated by the fact that the incentives of
ocials in diering jurisdictions are often not aligned. Developing countries would like to
get access to the capital provided by oset programs, and may be less directly concerned
about the true mitigation associated with any given project. At least in the context of an
oset regime, the enforcement powers in eect reside outside of local jurisdictions. Final
accreditation decisions are made by an international governing body in the case of the
CDM, and by the U.S. EPA in the case of H.R. 2454.
The third issue, to which I will devote the bulk of our attention in this paper, relates
to the fundamental aspect of oset programs. This is the fact that oset programs require
a determination of an emissions baseline from which the attributable reductions can be
measured. Assuming the institutional issues described above could be overcome, regulators
should be able to reliably verify the actual emissions of a facility, or at least a sector.
However, baselines (e.g. the emissions in the absence of an oset) by denition cannot be
observed since they are the product of a \what-if" exercise. The regulator can hope to
accurately measure the emissions of a facility after it registers for an oset, but can only
estimate what those emissions would have been if the facility had not sold any osets. By
contrast, under a cap-and-trade program, the baseline is essentially zero, and rms must
provide emissions allowances to oset any emissions observed above zero.
3Murray, et. al. highlight the fact that about half the potential GHG savings from the forestry sector
comes from Africa, and that governance and infrastructure improvements are likely necessary before much
of that potential can be reliably tapped.
4By structuring a program around the concept of paying rms to reduce emissions, oset
regimes become vulnerable to two classic regulatory problems; moral hazard and adverse
selection. The latter involves paying too much to rms with already low emissions, while
the former involves rms actively taking steps to inate their baselines. I discuss each of
these issues in the following subsections.
2.1 Moral Hazard
The moral hazard, or perverse incentive, problem stems from the fact that emissions
baselines are not only the private information of rms, but can also in some cases be
readily inuenced by those rms. In the oset context, this can take two forms. Firms
(or countries) could actively pursue investments in high-carbon sources, with the intent
of earning oset payments to drop those investments. Alternatively, rms or countries
could delay investments that would lower emissions from existing sources with the same
intention.
One of the most controversial oset initiatives has been the funding of HFC-23 mitiga-
tion under the CDM. This is an extremely potent GHG that is a byproduct of industrial
coolant manufacturing. Because of its potency, investments to capture HFC-23 emissions
qualied for large CDM credits whose value arguably far exceeded the value of the product
for which this pollutant was a byproduct. In the face of these obviously perverse incen-
tives, it has been argued that rms expanded or maintained operations solely to qualify
for CDM payments to capture their byproduct.4 New projects for the capture of HFC-23
may no longer qualify for CDM credits, and activities to capture industrial gases claim an
increasingly modest share of newly qualied projects.
2.2 Adverse Selection
The primary concern in oset markets is the phenomenon that oset sales will be partic-
ularly attractive to rms' whose true baselines are lower than the regulators' estimates.
These rms can essentially be paid for \reductions" that would have happened anyway. In
the jargon of oset policy, this problem is known as additionality. In H.R. 2454, additional
is dened as:
4See Wara, 2008. Grubb et al. argue that, despite the incentive problems, the program did result in
meaningful early reductions in a very potent GHG.
5The term additional, when used with respect to reductions or avoidance, or to se-
questration of greenhouse gases, means reductions, avoidance, or sequestration that
result in a lower level of net greenhouse gas emissions or atmospheric concentration
than would occur in the absence of an oset project.
The additionality problem has come to dominate the debates over oset markets, and
there is a large amount of enforcement language and eort put into trying to mitigate it.
There is also a rich literature on environmental regulation under imperfect information that
has also focused on this problem. In this literature, the main culprit is adverse selection.
Particularly relevant for this discussion is the work of Montero (1999 and 2000), which
examines the consequences of voluntary \opt-in" to a cap-and-trade program. These opt-
in provisions, such in the US SO2 program, bear many similarities to oset mechanisms.
In Montero's derivation, allowing opt-in produces a trade-o between the eciency gains
of lower-cost abatement and the \excess emissions" resulting from adverse selection.
However, some of this focus on additionality and the mechanisms deployed to combat
it may be misguided as not all additionality problems may stem from adverse selection. A
key issue is the extent to which an overestimate of baselines is a rm-specic or aggregate
phenomenon. The regulators information about aggregate emissions is also a factor. If
the additivity problem stems from the fact that the regulator overestimated the baselines
from the entire sector, then the implications of an oset program can be very dierent.
The result is still less \abatement" than expected, but this does not necessarily translate
into more emissions than expected.
Consider the case of the Chinese power sector. As Wara (2008) documents, an im-
pressive percentage of new Chinese power plants received CDM credits by virtue of their
not being coal plants. Almost certainly, as Wara argues, some of these plants would have
utilized non-coal technology in the absence of an oset payment.5 However, consider the
possibility that future projections of Chinese \business as usual" (BAU) emissions, and
consequently emissions caps in the developed world, assumed that new power plants would
utilize coal. If this were true, then the BAU projection for the entire Chinese power sec-
tor, and therefore of future global emissions was overstated. Viewed in this light, the
5Haya (2009) provides many examples of energy projects in India that funded under the CDM were not
considered additional even by their developers. Lewis (2010), by contrast, emphasizes what she considers
a critical role osets have played in providing nancing for Chinese power projects.
6CDM provided new information about aggregate emissions, and could in theory allow for
reductions from the capped sector to adjust to this new information.
In the sale of osets, the key information asymmetry lies in the estimates of BAU
emissions, in particular for the uncapped sector. It is common in the mechanism design
literature to assume that the regulator knows the distribution of information (here ex-
pected emissions, or \baselines") but does not know where any specic rm falls in that
distribution. This is the asymmetry framework utilized by Montero (2000). In related
work (Bushnell, 2010), I represent this as a special case, but it is also important to con-
sider the very real prospect that the regulator may not have perfect information about
even the aggregate distribution of baselines. In particular the regulator may be wrong
about the expected mean baseline.
Independently Distributed Baselines
First consider the case where the regulator does know the distribution of baselines, but
not the baseline of an individual rm. For any given rm the actual marginal costs of
providing osets might be lower or higher than that of the average rm in the uncapped
population. This is because their true baseline emissions from which they must abate may
be higher or lower than the regulator's estimate. This \true" cost of osets, reects the
actual costs of reducing emissions from a baseline level that diers from the regulators
estimate. Thus the rms with the lowest actual baselines have the lowest \costs," and in
a competitive market these will be rms selling osets. Conversely, it is the high baseline
rms for whom oset sales are most expensive, who stay out of the oset market.
Since the low-baseline rms participate and the high baseline rms do not, the actual
reductions from the uncapped sector will be less than the osets traded and total emissions
from the uncapped sector will be greater than the ocial estimate of reductions. Although
the regulator's estimate of total baseline emissions from the uncapped sector are correct,
the self selection of low-baseline rms into the oset program leaves only high-baseline
rms without abatement. The result, after osets are transacted, is more emissions than
anticipated from the uncapped sector and therefore more emissions overall.
This is essentially the framework examined by Montero (2000). If I assume that the
cap is set with optimal desired emissions levels in mind, this excess of pollution becomes
a potentially serious problem. There are also savings, as the capped sector spends less to
7abate. Montero demonstrates these trade-os.6
Correlated Baselines Among Uncapped Firms
An alternative implication emerges as the baseline levels become more highly correlated.
Consider the possibility that regulators over-estimate the BAU emissions from the entire
uncapped sector. The oset costs of most rms are now lower than the actual costs of
abatement since most have to do less abatement than expected. Prices for osets and
allowances are therefore lower and participation in the oset market increases. Although
there are more osets being sold, there is now much less abatement going on, and the
share of emissions from the capped sector increases quite a bit relative to the case with
no osets. However, total emissions are actually below the aggregate expected level. This
is because of the large negative shock to emissions in the uncapped sector. I dene excess
emissions as additional emissions above the cap that are created by introducing osets. In
the case of highly correlated baselines, total emissions from the uncapped sector (vertical
striped area) can be much lower than expected, even though there is considerable amount
of emissions reductions that are not \additional." This is because the low baselines of
rms who are selling osets also imply low baselines even from rms who are not selling
osets.
Note that introducing osets does increase emissions relative to the no-oset case. In
the absence of osets, aggregate emissions are well below the cap because the low-emissions
shock fell outside the cap. 7 The low realization of baseline emissions make compliance
with the cap easier, and allowance prices adjust accordingly.8
In this example, the baselines of most uncapped rms are over-estimated. The excess
emissions of oset markets are not symmetric to the baseline realization, however. If the
6If unlimited transfers are allowed, optimal emissions levels can still be obtained by anticipating the
adverse selection and reducing the cap in the capped sector by the amount of excess emissions produced
by the osets.
7This discussion assumes that the cap is set in terms of emissions, rather than an outcome-based
measure such as atmospheric concentration of GHG.
8This result is similar but not necessarily identical to what would happen if both sectors were capped.
If both were capped, then the lower baselines could lower the aggregate abatement necessary without
requiring active abatement from the uncapped sector. This can be more ecient as active abatement
(the portion of oset sales require action) could still cost more than the equilibrium permit price. If the
abatement quantity required from the capped sector yields a marginal abatement cost, after accounting
for the lower baselines, that is less than the cost of abatement from the uncapped sector, it would be
more ecient for all active abatement to come from the capped sector - even though less active abatement
would be required due to the lower baselines. In this case the \maximal cap" would be more ecient.
8baseline emissions are underestimated this simply reduces the amount of osets sold. In
the extreme, if the baselines of all rms are underestimated, then there is no adverse
selection problem, in the sense that no rm is being paid to do what it would have done
anyway absent a payment. In fact uncapped rms would have to do more abatement than
they would receive credit for. While underestimating the BAU emissions of uncapped
rms can lead to problems stemming from overall regulations that are, ex post, too lax,
these problems are not exacerbated by the existence of an oset market.
In summary, the implications of the adverse selection problem is tied strongly to the as-
sumptions about the distribution of \errors" in the forecast of business as usual emissions.
If this error is independently distributed across rms, osets can produce under-abatement.
If the errors are highly correlated, however, the oset market can reveal information about
the aggregate baseline and allow the abatement decisions of rms in the capped sector to
adjust accordingly.
2.3 Discussion
As the previous section demonstrates, the question of additionality can be viewed in two
lights; the adverse selection view, in which osets pay the \wrong" rms to reduce while
other rms more than make up the dierence, and one in which uncapped rms benet
from a coincidental, surprisingly clean development path. In some circumstances there can
be an important distinction between the two types of additionality. If the oset market
were dominated by the latter \pleasant surprise" phenomenon, osets can play a useful
role despite the additionality problem.
Of course the degree to which this distinction matters is closely linked to the level of
the cap in the capped sector. In the context of Kyoto treaty the reductions required of
the signatories are extremely modest. Any prospect of a pleasant surprise among non-
signatories would not come close to constituting the overall reductions called for by the
IPCC and other groups. In short, most view the Kyoto treaty as so lax that the world
needs every ton of reductions it can produce. This is reected in the fact that there has
been relatively little market for excess reduction credits from Annex 1 Kyoto nations, such
as Russia and the U.K., because those excess credits are viewed as coincidental. These
credits, known as \hot air," have largely been shunned, although this picture could change
9as Kyoto deadlines approach.9 The distinction also has less meaning in the context of
voluntary oset markets, where there is no mandatory cap to be adjusted.
Looking forward to a post-Kyoto world, however, the implications change somewhat. If
a signicant share of developed nations commit to proposed targets of 50% to 80% reduc-
tions, a pleasant surprise scenario could inuence thinking about the needed stringency of
those caps.10 The potential stringency of future caps is largely dependent upon a political
process, and the potential role of osets plays a part in those negotiations. Those close
to this process acknowledge that a tighter cap in the U.S. would be much more likely to
gain acceptance if osets are a part of the picture. If caps in the developed world are set
ambitiously enough, this may not be the kind of Faustian bargain that critics of oset
markets make it out to be.
On the other hand, if the worst-case IPCC scenarios materialize, even 80 % reductions
from developed nations would be insucient to achieve a stabilization of GHG at levels
deemed acceptable by the IPCC. Active abatement would have to be pursued in developing
countries. Even under these circumstances osets can play an important role for some
sectors of developing countries.
An examination of the IPCC scenarios (gure 1) for future BAU GHG emissions reveals
just how much scope there is for an impact of a coincidentally clean development path.
There is a great deal of uncertainty about future emissions, with much of that uncertainty
falling in the developing world. While fossil-fuel intensive, high population scenarios imply
roughly a tripling of emissions by 2100, other scenarios imply a peak around 2050 followed
by a steady decline.
Another key question is therefore whether additionality is likely to reect adverse se-
lection or common low baselines. In the case studied by Montero (2000), power plants
that opted into the SO2 program had low baselines because their output was reduced, to
be replaced by other plants. The case studies of the CDM appear to be dierent matters.
There is evidence that many projects earned emissions reduction credits while not meet-
ing the broad denition of additionality. The power plant projects identied in India and
China may very well have not been additional, but their construction did not imply higher
output from some other power facilities.
9Grubb, et. al, 2010
10The Annex I nations under the Kyoto protocol account for roughly half of global GHG emissions
today, but under the IPCC A2 scenario this share would decline to under 1/3.
10Figure 1: Emissions Trajectories of IPCC Scenarios
3 Implications for Oset Market Design
The above discussion attempts to highlight three implications. First, not all forms of
additionality should be viewed as equally onerous to the eectiveness and eciency of
emissions caps. Second, the perverse incentives to manipulate baselines are an equally
serious concern with no redeeming qualities. Third, oset markets can produce several
other types of unintended consequences such as leakage, but those risks apply to almost
any measures directed at reducing GHG emissions at less than a global scale. The current
regulatory focus on additionality tends to paint all these problems with a broad brush
without consideration of the context or their implications.
With these observations in mind, it is useful to consider the various policy tools that
have been adopted or considered in order to address the perceived diculties with oset
mechanisms. Importantly, two frequently mentioned solutions, capping the number of
osets and discounting their eectiveness, do not address these problems very well. A
cap on the number of osets allowed into a market can limit the overall severity of the
adverse selection problem, but by less than commonly thought. If adverse selection is a
serious problem, the projects that are allowed would be the ones with the lowest baseline
draws. If the baselines in the uncapped sector are instead highly correlated and much
11lower than expected, then limits on osets restrict the ability of the mechanism to adjust
to the \pleasant surprise" and allow for fewer reductions in the capped sector.
A devaluation of osets treats all projects as equally non-additional. As I have argued
above, if this truly were the case and caps were strict enough in the capped sector, this is
precisely when additionality does not reduce eciency. In fact it produces the exact same
outcome as if the uncapped sector were under a mandatory cap and had been allocated
allowances equal to its expected baseline. In either case, emissions are reduced and the
uncapped sector reaps a windfall. However, both sectors benet from the added partic-
ipation of the uncapped sector relative to a case where that participation is limited. If
instead baselines are uncorrelated, and additionality is a serious problem, only the most
extreme non-additional projects are likely to be nancially viable at the reduced returns
provided by a generic devaluation.
The solution identied by Montero is very dierent. A rst-best reduction can be
achieved if the cap were further tightened in anticipation of the excess emissions yielded
from adverse selection in the uncapped sector. This allows full participation by the un-
capped sector, but still reaches the same overall emissions aggregated over both sectors.
Unfortunately, this approach is both politically dicult and depends upon accurately pre-
dicting, on a sectoral level, the severity of the adverse selection problem.
To date the primary bulwark against additionality concerns has been a review process
that has been simultaneously criticized as too onerous to allow for substantial investment
and also inadequate in weeding out non-additional projects.11 While some are concerned
this may fatally delay investments, others feel that the incentive problems can only be
adequately managed within a small program.
Those concerned with streamlining the review process are attracted to a shift away
from project-specic review to a more programmatic approach. This oers several potential
benets. First, a programmatic approach can greatly lower the transactions costs of review
and certication relative to the value of the osets produced. Second, such an approach
can help access a broader array of activities including energy eciency and prevention
of deforestation that have been largely absent from markets such as the CDM. Last, a
program level review can focus on risks, at an industry level, of the \bad" form of adverse
selection while being less concerned with correlated, coincidental reductions. For example,
11Grubb, et. al. 2010, Victor and Wara, 2008.
12investments in building eciency may very well prove to be economic in the absence of
oset programs, and therefore not truly additional. But even if that is the case, increased
eciency in one building is unlikely to imply worse eciency in others. A programmatic
approach can also mitigate the moral hazard problem at the facility level by reducing the
importance of the actions at a specic facility. However, there are still concerns about
government level incentives.
Last, one tool that has not been applied to oset markets is the application of random-
ized trials. For example, a population of applications could be chosen to supply osets
while another set is retained as a control group against which to judge the actions of the
accepted population. This may be usefully combined with a shift in focus to evaluation
at the program or sector level. Such approaches have been usefully applied to address
similar adverse selection and moral hazard problems in programs that pay for reductions
in energy use.12 Atypical increases in emissions from countries or rms that become el-
igible for osets relative to those that are not would indicate an ination of baselines.
Measuring the reductions from oset eligible projects relative to others can detect adverse
selection relative to a common baseline, but it would also discount gains from commonly
shared (e.g. coincidental) reductions. Since, returning to the earlier discussion, there are
circumstances in which it is benecial to allow credits for those coincidental reductions,
the treatment of these shared eects would depend upon the stringency of overall caps.
12Wolak, 2010.
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